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NOTE AND COMMENT
CoNTINuoUs TRESPASS AND I PEAm WRoNG.-In the recent -case of
Perkins v. Trueblood, (Cal., May, igig), 19I Pac. 642, the facts were that, in
March, I912, the defendant, a surgeon, set the leg of the plaintiff, but as the
fracture did not heal satisfactorily "the defendant separated the surfaces of
the bone during the month of April, 1912, and again set the plaintiff's leg."
In a suit for malpractice, begun on April 9, 1913, it was held, that the cause
of action "was not barred by the CoDE or PROcEDURE, Article 340, subd.-3, pre-
scribing a one year limitation period in such cases." It is difficult to tell from
the report of the case what the theory of the court was as to the cause of
action and the running of the statute of limitation, but it is evident that the
court must have considered this not a case of "continuous trespass," with the
old connotation of that term, but rather as a case of "repeated wrong," and
that the statute began to run not from March, 1912, when the leg was orig-
inally set, but from April, 1912, the date when it was negligently reset.
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The confusion of these two phrases, above quoted, has caused the courts
a great deal of trouble, but wherever the facts have been of such a nature as
to allow an initial wrong with continuing results to be differentiated from
an initial wrong aftdrwards followed by a new wrong, they have reached
the conclusion found in the Caifornia case. In the English case of
Clegg v. Dearden, (1848), 12 Ad. and El. (N.S.) 575, a'trespasser had broken
through a wall in a mine and, after the statute had run on the original tres-
pass, water had run through the hole and injured the plaintiff. It was held
in an action on the case that there could be no recovery because leaving the
hole was not a continuous trespass but only the result of the initial trespass,
and the running of the statute had barred that trespass together with its
results. In the case of the National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co.,
(x885) 57 Mich. 83 the facts were identical with those in the English case
and the conclusion was the same. In the case of Gillette v. Tucker (rgo2) 67
Ohio St. Io6, a surgeon sewed up a sponge in a wound and left it there
until after the statute had run on the original negligence of sewing it in the
wound. The holding in this case, finally affirmed by the Ohio court in Mc-
Arthur v. Bowers, (i9o5) 72 Ohio St. 656, was the same as in the cases of
injury to land, above cited. The injury caused by the sponge remaining in
the wound was held to be the result of the original wrongful act and not a
new wrong, and recovery was denied the plaintiff because the statute had run
on the original trespass. But in the -case of Perry County v. Railroad Co.
(1885), 43 Ohio St. 451, it was held that "each day's failure" to restore a
bridge destroyed by fault of the defendant "was a fresh breach of an obliga-
tion" so to do; i. e., the leaving the hole in the road was a "repeated wrong"
each successive day that it was so left.
In line with this last decision of the Ohio court it has recently been held
in Judd v. Blakeman (97), 175 Ky. 848, that each successive overflow of the
plaintiff's land, caused by the negligent construction of the defendant, gave
rise to a new cause of action, each successive overflow being treated as a
"repeated wrong." There was a similar holding on the same state of facts in
Scheurich v. Empire District Electric Co. (Mo., 1916), 188 S. W. ix4. In the
case of Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (i915), 86 Wash. 211, where there
was a continuous publication of a libel, each publication was held .to consti-
tute a separate libel and therefore a "repeated wrong," for which a recovery
would -be had, even if more than the statutory period had elapsed since the
first insertion.
It would seem wise then to bring one's suit for "repeated wrong" rather
than for "continuous trespass," and this too whether the action be for an
injury to land, a wrong to the person or a slander to reputation. A more
extensive consideration of this subject will appear in a later issue of this
Rx r w. J.H.D.
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